autocratic military or civilian one-party governance systems in many countries; civil wars and wars between neighbouring states; and more recently, the scourge of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Added to the historic handicaps of underdevelopment bequeathed by colonialism, these movements blunted the ability of African countries to take ad vantage of opportunities offered by the current phase of globalisation, while exposing them to all its negative effects. In relation to universities, the relevance of these developments was the general retreat of the state from social provisioning and the declines in the level of real resources available to African higher education, at the very time that the role of knowledge in social development became accentuated. In the result universities, in common with other social institutions took severe body blows, especially in relation to research and graduate study, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as will be shown later. the contemporary orthodoxy of development economics that assigned to the state a decisive leadership role in these areas. What were perhaps special in the African situation were the degree of specificity and narrowness with which the purposes were stated in some instances and the generosity of the public support to the new universities. Thus, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) of Mozambique was “nationalised” in 1980 by the new revolutionary government and given the task of producing human resources for the new socialist economy (Mario, 2003: 8), while the University of Brazzaville from its inception in 1971 had the mission of “training … national executives within the spirit of scientific socialism” (Mbemba, 2003). Earlier, the Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar had been linked to the Senegalese drive for intellectual recovery and the generation of ., 1996: 192). Even in respect of research and policy support, the record was not all bleak, though it fell short of the very high expectations. Products of the national universities and other higher education institutions took increasing charge of the local science and technology infrastructure and its management, and were responsible for most of the research and development activities conducted in their countries. Today, the brain drain not withstanding, it is difficult to imagine where Africa would be in these matters without her universities and their operation during the “lost years” of the 1980s! In the first years of political independence the overall mandate and mission of Africa’s higher education and its institutions, especially the universities were clear enough to be taken for granted by all. However, differences soon began to surface. Impatience with the colonial model of liberal arts and basic sciences graduates moving into the services and business began to be voiced by those, especially among political leaders, concerned with the building up of high level, more specialised skills for the public service and leadersh ip of the professions. This came to a head at the UNESCO/Economic Commission for Africa Conference of university leaders and outside participants held in Tananarive, Madagascar in 1962. The consensus at the conference saw universities as a “key instrument for national development”, giving rise to the notion of the “developmental university”. However, the colonial birthmarks were still prominent, and the modified mission implied by the Tananarive consensus did not quite materialise. A decade later, at a workshop organised in Accra by the Asso ciation of African Universities (AAU) (itself conceived at the Tananarive conference) the African university leaders and policy makers who dominated the event sought to give meaning to the workshop theme, “Creating the African University: Emerging issues in the 1970s”. They agreed on the need to have African university problems defined and solutions proposed and implemented by Africans, to give the universities a truly “African identity”. In their criticism of the colonial hangover and continued dominance by outsiders they were not acknowledging failure, but rather affirming a will to be more proactive and self-directed in response to new demands. (Yesufu, 1973) Expectations remained high, but no higher than the general levels of optimism and confidence in the future. Except for those who lived through the experience, it is difficult to capture the purposefulness and positive atmosphere of those years. Yet within a decade of the Accra Workshop, the acceleration of major developments at the global, continental and national levels were to destabilise the environment of higher education in Africa and erode the basis of this early optimism, and the general confidence in Africa’s universities, in common with other public institutions. As further background to the current challenges, we now set out briefly the major changes relevant to our account. The environment changes – globalisation and its discontents ] This explains the secular long-run movement in the terms of trade against producers and exporters of primary commodities -where the same volume of exports of primary products enables a country to import less and less from outside – reducing their import capacity even as it predisposes them to external indebtedness. At the national level, the resulting decline in export volumes as well as the relative decline in the price of primary products in world trade in the 1980s and 1990s, the mishandling of exchange rates and of external reserves, and the huge external debt overhang together created major resource gaps for the countries of Africa. This put serious pressure on their import capacity and the availability of resources for essential econom ic and social investment. The results included increased dependence of the typical sub-Saharan Africa country on aid from the developed countries, which was never going to be enough to offset the resource shortfalls. These were some of the factors behind the cycle of economic and social crises, which has been the lot of sub- Saharan Africa to this day. Concurrent with these material developments, was the rise of neo-liberal ideology in the 1980s. The pro-market/anti-state bias of this ideology was both an outcome of the specific form of globalisation in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, and a means for reinforcing those material forces, by pushing for and facilitating the removal of barriers to the flow of private capital in the domestic and international spheres. Coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of the alternative vision of society by the end of the 1980s, this gave rise to the unchallenged hegemony of capitalism and neo-liberal ideology, which came to be portrayed in many quarters as necessary elements of globalisation. Through the conflation of globalisation with the neo-liberal agenda and its promotion as the unstoppable movement of our times, a major dose of mythology was injected into the discourse on globalisation – the myth of the inevitability, almost “naturalness” of the neo-liberal agenda. This combination of reality and myth in the globalisation discourse has had a profound impact on contemporary life and development. The reality of globalisation - deriving from movements in economy and production - erodes the capacity of the typically marginalised and dependent sub-Saharan African state to generate enough production, savings and investment to ensure sustainable development. For its part, the ideology of neo-liberalism and the institutional ar rangements that promote it, limit the policy ) [11], public subventions, the mainstay of all our universities, could not be sustained at levels that would of privileging expenditure on basic education at the expense of higher education, a posture reflecting the policy positions of the World Bank and leading donor agencies, as well as the argument that the social rates of return on investments in basic education were higher than in higher education. [13] With all this occurring at a time when the under-resourced and run-down universities were having to cope with bloated enrolments, it was not surprising that attempted reforms were met with resistance by the institutions. Clearly, such reforms, challenging long-held assumptions and threatening established interests, were unlikely to be welcome news to the university community under the best of circumstances. Matters were compounded by the autocratic nature of the military and one-party government regimes of the time, which had little legitimacy for effecting any real mobilisation behind the reforms, despite th Ghana] and the vigour of its prosecution have driven the universities to take some positive measures, many of which have been under consideration internally for years. At the sa me time, it can be argued that the manner of its introduction and attempted implementation generated stronger resistance to the programme than was necessary, leading to avoidable delays in addressing problems acknowledged to be in need of urgent attention, and the long-term alienation of important sections of the university community from the Government and its education policies.” (Sawyerr, 1994: 48) Within the last decade there have been strong indications that the situation is changing, that increasing numbers of university leaders have come round to accepting that what was happening was not simply a disturbance of the normal order of things, calling for little more than measures aimed at restoring the old order. The realisation has dawned that many of the assumptions of the preceding three or four decades needed to be fundamentally challenged; that modes of work and organisation, as well as expenditure priorities needed to be seriously adjusted. In addition, the strong trend to democracy and the liberalised polit ical atmosphere in most countries in the 1990s facilitated genuine engagement among the key players in the field - government and university community. In this atmosphere, the specific problems of African higher education have begun to engage serious attention, both within Africa and within the donor community. Several African governments and institutions have undertaken major reviews and strategic planning, and the leading donors to African education, which had for over a decade turned away from higher education support, have started looking anew for ways of helping to support the re-energisation of African higher education. [14] If these reform endeavours are not to fail, or indeed make matters worse, it is important to appreciate the true nature of the challenges facing African higher education, taking into account, its origins and specific features [15]. These latter would include such issues as: The colonial and immediate post-colonial origins of most of Africa’s systems and institutions, as reflected in the fact that the vast majority of the universities are public, with mandates which define them explicitly as part of the national development project; The small number of universities at the apex of the educational pyramid in most countries (Fig. 3) (with major exceptions), shouldering the entire burden of higher education leadership – a factor that limits the scope for diversification; Exploding enrolment, side by side with huge unmet demand; (Figs 2 & 4 Low national and average household incomes, with the result that higher education represents a heavier charge on national and average household incomes in Africa than anywhere else (see Figs. 5 & 6 ) [16], even though in per capita terms higher education expenditure is lower in Africa than elsewhere; Generally low levels of literacy (Fig. 7) which, combined with the pervasive poverty at both the national and household levels, means that, even under the best of conditions there will be difficulty in sustaining higher education at levels of coverage and quality appropriate to current needs; Poor infrastructure for teaching and research, and weak links to the global knowledge system; Increased diversity in the demands on higher education - from governments, students, the community and the productive sector; ). The vast bulk consisted of public universities, which accounted for almost all the increase till the 1980s. The number of private universities, estimated at seven in 1960, remained below 20 ti ll the mid-1980s, only to begin a rapid climb, from 27 in 1990 to an estimated 71 within ten years and 84 two years later. (See Fig. 9 ) Overall student enrolment increased at an equally striking rate. From an estimated total of 181,000 in 1975, there was a three-fold increase within five years, according to published figures, to over 600,000 by 1980. After something of a lull the numbers more than doubled again in a decade, to 1,750,000 by 1995. (See Fig 2 ) [18] What was striking about the spurt of expansion of both institutions and enrolment in the 1990s was the acceleration in the rate of establishment of private universities . (See Fig 9 ). Though their number is still low and student enrolment quite small relative to the public institutions, their rapid spread represents a new departure in higher education provision in Africa. Evidence of this more From our selection, the mover in the 1980s was Kenya, which went from 2 private universities in 1980 to 9 by 1990. In the 1990s it was Tanzania (from 1 in 1990 to 11 by 2000); Uganda (2 to 10); Congo (0 to 4) and Senegal (0 to 3). In the last couple of years, the movers have been Burundi, which went from none in 2000 to 4 by 2002, and Ghana. The case of Ghana is particularly striking. In 1990, there were three public universities with a total enrolment of just under ten thousand (10,000) students, and no private universities. By the academic year 2000/2001 the numbers had risen to five public universities and seven private universities [19], with a total combined enrolment of just under 43,245 made up of 40,673 in the public, and around 2500 in the private universities. The trend has been just as sharp in Mozambique, where enrolment at the University of Laurenço Marques (later Universidade Eduardo Mondlane) stood at 2433 at independence and the start of the civil war in 1975. After dropping to 750 within three years, it climbed back to 4000 by 1990. Less than ten years later, the number had trebled to over 12,000. Similar stories can be told almost everywhere. Thus, in the Republic of Congo, the number of students at the Université Marien N’gouabi grew from 3785 in 1976 to 19,000 by 1997, while in Nigeria the rise was from 176,000 in 1989/90 to 376,000 a decade later. Another general feature of this expansion of higher education has been its persistence all through the social, political and economic upheavals of the 1980’s and 1990’s, as well as the civil and other wars in several countries. Thus the increase s in enrolment in the Republic of Congo [20] and Mozambique, noted above, occurred despite civil wars. Indeed in the latter case six new institutions were established over the period of the civil war, a period which saw Mozambique become the poorest country in the world. (Mbemba, 2003; Mario 9 ). Yet these African averages mask considerable variation from one country to the next. Thus, while the ratio for countries like Burundi, Mozambique and Tanzania fell short of 1% in 1995, others at the high end were – Botswana: 5.3%; Gabon: 8% and South Africa: 18.1% (World Bank 2002: Annex 13). In view of this generally low participation rate, rapid and substantial increases in enrolment at arrive at similar conclusions for Mozambique. They found that 70% of the fathers of students at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) had secondary education or higher, compared to fewer than 3% in the general population. The figures for mothers of students were 50% as against less than 1% in the general population. Using parental tongue as an indicator revealed that Portuguese, the language of privilege in Mozambique, was the parental tongue of almost 70% of UEM students, and the means of family communication for over 60%. This compares to a figure of 9% in the general population. More specifically, the survey showed that students from more privileged backgrounds were disproportionately represented in ., writing about the situation in Mozambique draw this sombre conclusion: “The evidence suggests that there is a growing tendency for the educational system as a whole, and the field of higher education in particular to reproduce existing social inequalities. … If measures are not taken to improve the chances of less privileged children (either by providing scholarships to private schools and/or in the long term strengthening the quality of government schools), we will witness, with the impossibility of social mobility through education, the consolidation of a closed socio-economic elite ., 2003: 30-31) [26] There is another dimension to this bias in favour of the already favoured. Despite the relative decrease in state support for higher education and the rise of the number of fee-charging private institutions, university education in Africa remain s quite heavily subsidised by the state. Thus, to the extent that university admissions favour the privileged the public subsidy goes disproportionately to the already privileged. This tendency to regressive social spending appears to have reached exaggerated proportions, say, in Uganda where out of a total of over 25,000 university students, about 3,000 (less than 12%) received the performance-based public subsidy in the early 1990s, the rest being either in private universities or paying fees at Makerere, the premier public university. To make matters worse, Mayanja’s study shows that a disproportionate share of those enjoying the subsidy were students from the high-income group, who attended the best and most expensive primary and secondary schools and obtained the high grades required for free university education. A study of the situation in Nigeria similarly concludes that “On the whole, the least expensive [and best] universities, in terms of tuition fees have a student population coming from a more well-to-do background than those in the more expensive [and less good] universities, which sell their admission at a high price”. (Lebeau, 2000: 153) All this falls in line with the observation of Patrin os’ that in the typical developing country, the top 20% of the income bracket appropriate more than 30% of public subsidies while the bottom 20% appropriate between 5% and 15%. (Patrinos, 2002) However, this should not be read as support for the removal of all public subsidies from higher education, for that would almost certainly kill off university and university levels had some initial success in equalising access opportunities across considerable social and geographic differences, while the drastic reduction or removal of those subsidies has contributed to new forms of social exclusion. These crucial issues call for more systematic studies than have been done so far, using more robust and refined indicators than schools attended, residence, parental language, etc. Such studies should inform the crafting of social policy in this matter, given its very grav e implications for equity and social stability. Quality and Relevance The principal contribution of a university to maintain quite high levels of teaching and scholarship. [29] Indeed, vibrant local research with a strong component of fieldwork led not only to the production of international quality work but also to the rise of acknowledged centres of excellence in particular fields. The list would include the Makerere Institute of Social Research; the “Historical Schools” of Ibadan University and the perceptions of quality in teaching and research. The situation at Makerere University in the 1970s and 1980s is summarised in Box 1 , as an illustration of the general deterioration in the policy and material environment that characterised many of Africa’s university campuses at the time. … and diversion of focus In addition to its devastating effect on the conditions of teaching, learning and research, this state of decay had a different sort of impact, to which I wish to draw attention. This is the massive diversion of focus from the core business of the university, especially the improvement of the curriculum, pedagogy and research. University managers and administrators were caught up in a grim struggle to keep their institutions liquid and operational. [30] Beyond that there were the ., 2001), while the University of Ouagadougou is reported to be facing difficulty retaining staff because of the summarises the situation of the public universities in Ghana. A recent study concluded as follows: “ A look at the age structure of all the public universities reveals that around 40% of the teaching and “And in the seventh ‘year’ …” A final aspect of the question of staffing and staff quality on which we offer comment is the virtual collapse of the system of sabbatical leave . The practice of enabling faculty to get away from regular teaching once every seven years, to spend up to a year renewing themselves was one of the most effective means of enabling faculty to remain abreast of developments in their field and maintain international contacts. Ideally the year should be devoted to working at advanced (1996). It is rewarding, if rather depressing, to go back to these texts at this time when the proper role of the African university in development an d transformation is once more to the fore. The central message of these early assessments is that the idea of the developmental university is not without contradiction and complication. While there is no disputing the propriety of the concern to ensure that universities, like all other social institutions, made their due contribution to social development, there has always remained a question about the tolerable and feasible limits of such involvement, consistent with the basic mission of the university - teaching and research (Coleman, 1994: 347). As noted above, over and above the calibre of its graduates, a university’s contribution to development turns on the quality of the knowledge it generates and disseminates. Application, no matter how vigorous and well-intentioned, of unsound knowledge cannot conduce to development. Thus commentators on the developmental university have pointed out the indispensable role of the quality of its knowledge-generating base as a condition for a university’s effective discharge of its service and development functions. Thus, pushing for service and outreach without dealing with the massive quality deficits in the academic heartland is at best a risky undertaking. A second risk factor is the danger of a fundamental overload on the universities as they struggle to be all things to all people. We need to bear in mind at all times the sober admonitions of such .: “ … in the face of demands which far exceed their capacities, African universities would have to be highly selective and consider very carefully what they could expect to achieve, … given the means actually at their disposal. There are several deserving critical areas. However, it is important for the universities to strike a balance between what is essential and possible and what is desirable and possible but not essential ”. (1996: 197 - 198) [ ] (Emphasis supplied) Such advice, sound as it is, puts the typical university on the horns of a dilemma. The university needs the full support of the public and the policy maker in order to get the resources it needs to rehabilitate itself, revamp its courses and facili ties, and produce good teaching, research and ]. For much of this period higher education, especially the university sector was seen as a “public good”, and received very generous state support. For decades the small number of public universities concentrated the bulk of their countries’ intellectual capacities and resources within them, and shouldered almost exclusively the burden of university education, research and high-level work force development. This was supplemented by study abroad, especially at the graduate level. By the 1980s changes in the general environment of higher education had altered the basic assumptions underlying the structure and functioning of the system. We have noted that the rapid increases in university enrolments across the continent still left a large pool of qualified applicants with no places in the universities, which was seen in policy circles as a waste of human resources and a major social problem. New players, new demands The players … Apart from its extent, a significant new feature of the demand for university education in the post- independence years was the increasing diversity in the patterns of demand that emerged in the 1980s. This reflected the different types of students and the new knowledge needs that had been thrown up by the changing social and economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. While the majority of university students, and the bulk of demand still came from the age group 19–24 seeking full-time study towards regular degrees, increasing numbers were mature students who had missed the opportunity in earlier years; wo rkers who could only undertake part-time study; applicants interested in non-degree programmes; and mid-career business people and senior public servants requiring short executive courses and other forms of in-service training. There were also applicants able and willing to pay full cost for both regular and special programmes. The effect of all this was to bring into play a variety of student categories seeking types of programmes, courses and delivery modes beyond what the conventional institutions provided. Apart from a diversified student population and new kinds of courses and delivery modes, the institutions had also to address new knowledge needs. In addition to continued demand for basic research in all the established disciplines, the new knowledge needs were more applied and required in most cases, consultancies and policy advice. This placed emphasis on a wider range of knowledge services to be provided by the universities. ... the supply … expansion and diversification of demand coincided with two other related developments. One of these, namely, the over-stretching of university capacity resulting from expanded enrolment without commensurate resource increases, has already been noted. The second factor was the ]. However, this was not restricted to universities, as there were increases as well in both the public and private non-university tertiary sectors . In addition to this expansion in capacity of the conventional institutions new institutional forms new programme offerings , and new types of providers came into prominence. The institutional forms included part-time and evening classes, vacation courses and an increase in distance education. Though these were not altogether new, the scale and spread of their use was quite dramatic. More recent innovations have included the use of technology-intensive approaches such as on-campus FM Radio for delivery of courses at the University College of Education, Winneba, in Ghana. Further to these new institutional arrangements, programmes of a new, more vocational type, both degree and non-degree were introduced. These were in such areas as tourism and hotel management; information technology; business studies; human resource management; hospital management; theology; purchasing and supply; marketing; media and public relations. Interestingly, these new institutional forms and were occurring not only in the new institutions but also in established institutions, including the public universities. Makerere University, for instance, increased evening classes to more than triple the scale of regular day classes, and introduced courses in social sector planning, tourism and hotel management, while UCAD in Senegal admitted private fee-paying rise in the number of such private universities and their enrolments during the 1990s. While this development was inevitable and foreseeable, few could have predicted the rate of increase within the decade. (Fig 9 ) Thus, a study of private universities in Ghana conducted by the Association of African Universities (AAU) for the Ministry of Education in 1995, showed that at the time Ghana had no private universities, although there were plans for establishing two or three (AAU, 1995). Seven years later, as many as twenty-one private universities have been registered with the National Accreditation Board, with eight currently in operation. Similar stories can be told of other countries, as indicated earlier (Fig. 10 Table 1: Private University Enrolment as % of Total University Enrolment (Selected Countries) Cote d’Ivoire Ghana (2000/01) 6 Kenya Uganda Source : Various While the history and specific circumstances of private universities differ from case to case, and country to country, a number of common features may be identified. The first is the small size of their enrolments. As compared to their public counterparts, Africa’s private universities to date provide only a small See Table 1 , though rising proportion of university enrolment. Secondly, they provide a severely limited range of programmes and courses when compared to the public institutions. Cross-country evidence shows a decisive concentration on courses with a strong vocational and directly market-responsive character, and hardly any natural science or technology. Some institutions, especially those with church support, include more regular university degree programmes, especially Theology and other Arts courses, sometimes up to the Masters and PhD levels, though for the moment these are a small minority. In part, both the small size and the limited range of programmes of the typical private university can be explained by the relative newness of the institutions, many not more than five years old. However, these features also reflect what appears to be inherent limitations on the size and growth potential of private universities under present conditions. The obvious explanation for the generally limited range of programmes has to do with the fact that mounting the full range of courses such as are run by the typical public university would require initial capital investments In the fourth place, private universities rely very heavily on part-time faculty drawn mostly from the public institutions. This has very strong implications both for the quality of delivery at the private universities and for effective performance in the public institutions, as will be argued later. Note should also be taken of the strong presence of foreign backers and parent-bodies in the private tertiary sector. Where the local institutions are not franchises of foreign universities, many teach to the curriculum of foreign institutions and award their degrees. Other forms of affiliation with foreign institutions are in operation. For instan ce, sixteen out of the 21 private universities registered with the National Accreditation Board in Ghana have links with foreign institutions. The rest are affiliated to local universities. These lin The explanation for this difference is said to lie in the generally lower ent ry requirements in the private institutions, their concentration on the “softer subjects” in the humanities and the vocational area, and the greater flexibility of their programming, which tends to accommodate the special needs of women with families. There is need for more systematic compilation of data and more rigorous analysis of this very promising phenomenon. Women As % of University Enrolment in Public and Private Universities (selected countries and institutions) (%) Public Universities Private Universities. Congo Marien Ngouabi 24 Paradox Institute (1999/2000) 57 Business Admin Inst. 50 Ghana Univ. of Ghana (2002/03) 36 Private universities (average) 37.5 (averages) 30 54.5 Mozambique (1999) (averages) 25 43 Nigeria (1998) 35 Bayero (2001) 27 Senegal Université Cheikh Anta Diop (1998) 26.5 Uganda Mbarara (1998/99) 28.6 Makerere (2000) 34 Nkumba 56 Uganda Martyrs 50 Swaziland University of Swaziland (2001) 51.9 Source : Various While expansion of the private university sector has generally been welcomed, it has caused concern in some quarters. The first issue relates to the dominant presence of faith-based institutions for possible cross-subsidisation of essential but less “marketable” programmes and teaching modes. The last feature we would note is the potential of private institutions to introduce a different set of values into the higher education picture. On t in national economic growth and development. At the same time it clearly constitutes a “public good”, serving broad social purposes going beyond individual or economic development benefits. Other potential benefits include (a) the improvement of social justice through fair access; (b) the pursuit of knowledge for more than commercial ends; (c) the spread of a broad range of skills and capabilities across the entire population; and (d) the education of a democratically informed and critical citizenry. (Taskforce, 2000; Singh, 2001; World Bank, 2002) It is instructive that from the early years of independence it was accepted in Africa with hardly any question that university education was predominantly a “public good” and thus a proper charge on the public purse. This decisive “public good” perspective was influenced by the consideration that, given the situation of relative underdevelopment of most countries immediately after independence, education, including university education was seen as a key instrument for accelerated development and catching up with the rest of the world. This perception has continued to influence public expenditure patterns, with the result that in 1995 African countries spent annually on each university student, on average, about four times their per capita Gross National Product (GNP), as compared to a world-wide average of 77% and a figure of 36% for Europe and Central Asia (Fig. ). In the 1980s a number of factors tended to bring into question the undoubted support and the level of subsidies for higher education. The first set of factors turned on the strained economic conditions in most African countries. As previously indicated, this led to a substantial reduction in the amounts available for social sector expend iture. Against the background of the rapidly increasing university enrolments and the demand of other sectors for public resources, it became clear that the state could not continue to provide for university education at the levels of the 1960s and the 1970s. These material factors were reinforced by strong ideological and policy shifts. The first was a more general reflection of the neo-liberal agenda, which called for the retreat of the state from social provisioning and for increasing contributions from the direct beneficiaries of social services. The ideological dimension embraced the commodification of knowledge and the treatment of education as a service, educational expenditure as a “cost” rather than a social investment. This ideological posture was reinforced by the technical arguments that the rates of return to basic education were so much higher than returns to university education that efficiency required that the former should attract the bulk of public resources. This “rate of return” argument was strongly pressed both as policy advice to African governments and as conditionalities for funding. In addition, it influenced external donors into turn ing away from the support of higher education in favour of basic education. The second was a concern to expand and strengthen basic education under the principle of giving priority to “education for all” and, therefore, reducing the relative situation was contradictory. On the one hand, ther United Nations Millennium Development Goals for education – universal enrolment in primary education and elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education – without a strong tertiary education system”. More recently the case for the “re-insertion of the public good concerns into the agenda of higher education transformation” has been forcefully argued by analysts of the higher education scene in Africa. (Singh, 2001; Jonathan, 2001; Sawyerr, 2002). As has been argued by Ruth Jonathan and the present writer, the determination of the public good and the mode of its advancement through higher education are, however, far from simple. (Jonathan, 2001; Sawyerr, 2002) The point of departure is “… the recognition that the rightward shift in the paradigm of higher education that animates the reform process is but part of a more general ideological position that, consciously or unconsciously, regards restoration of the “public good” in higher education, without addressing the roots of the problem in political economy. We return to this issue in our concluding comment. It is, therefore, important not to equate advocacy for broader objectives for the reform process with that for the re-insertion of the “public good” in higher education transformation. Since notions of the “public good” turn on particular assumptions about the proper ends of social development Other difficult questions arise from the consideration that higher education is an inherently privileging experience. We have already seen that, even with formal equalisation of opportunity to access it, not all can enjoy the direct benefits of university education, as the socially-advantaged in virtually all of Africa’s universities although, as noted above, universities in Francophone Africa have had particular difficulty in enforcing those measures whose effect was to reduce benefits enjoyed by students and faculty. A number of more special innovations have been introduced in individual universities. We mention here but an indicative sample. At Bayero University in Nigeria a subsidised computer training ., 2002) The University of Ibadan also in Nigeria has introduced compulsory computer literacy for all staff and students. Universities in Ghana have been encouraged to introduce long-term partnerships between departments and faculties across universities for resource sharing, course delivery, collaborative research and graduate training. Already, the Departments of Geography and Resource Development of the University of Ghana and of Geography and Tourism of the University of Cape Coast, respectively, have been working in close collaboration. (Manuh et al ., 2002) Experimenting with new modes of delivery has been one of the means of accommodating enrolment pressures. Among these is the greater use of distance education. At the University of Ghana, the increased use of the pre-existing External Degree Centres, which are spread all over the country, has meant that in the academic year 2001/02, 10% of enrolled students were registered at those centres. Similarly, the University College of Education, Winneba (UCEW) has 30% of its enrolment either in Distance Learning Centres or in sandwich programmes, which bring them into residence for short periods only. In addition, as previously noted, UCEW has begun using FM radio for delivering some lectures on campus, supplemented by face-to-face group sessions. (Manuh, 2002) Other innovative measures involve increased university-industry linkages as a means of providing service to the community, raising income for the universities and providing hands-on experience for students. The Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), which has a long history of working with local mechanics at the nearby Suame Magazine, is also actively involved with the Cocoa Processing Company, which provides the University’s Department of Chemistry with both experience and income, while helping a major national industry with research and development. (Manuh et al ., 2002) At a more general level, several universities have introduced more vocational and “relevant” ., 2003:32-33) At Makerere University, women are admitted with grades 1.5 points below those of men. A particularly interesting instance concerns the development of franchising relations among institutions in Kenya. To capture some of the over 5000 students who seek higher education outside the country each year, it is reported that some of the public universities are establishing franchise arrangements with the “middle level colleges”, that is institutions not equipped or certified to deliver degree or diploma courses in their own right. Thus, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) is reported to have established franchise agreements with middle level colleges to produce its certificates, diplomas and even degrees in Information Technology as well as Management. (Ngome, 2002) In Senegal it is proposed to introduce competitions for government research funds, leading to full contracts, performance bonds, etc. The expectation is that this would encourage universities to form partnerships with other research institutes, industry and public laboratories, thereby establishing development research networks and facilitating interaction within the national kn owledge system. (N’diaye, 2002) Particularly far- reaching among the innovations has been the reservation of space at public universities for fee- paying students. This has happened at UCAD in Senegal, the University of Ghana and the KNUST in Ghana, and some of the universities in Kenya. However, the best known of all has been the dramatic developments at Makerere University over the last ten years. To this story, we Among the critical factors behind this sad tale, was the chronic under-funding of the university resulting from dramatic declines in government subvention, upon which it was totally reliant. To redress the situation, the university undertook a number of measures aimed principally at generating income independent of government sources. Key among these was the establishment of a quota for fee-paying students over and above the number supported by the government subvention. This involved the running of extra classes and the use of otherwise under-utilised facilities, and special payments to lecturers who taught those courses. The idea was that the income generated from the extra students would be used to restore and maintain essential teaching and learning facilities, and improve faculty working conditions. True to expectation, as the numbers of fee-paying students increased, their fees, together with income from other sources had a dramatic effect on the finances of the university, and therefore the status of its facilities and staff morale. As descr ibed in the Task Force Report, “… Makerere moved from the brink of collapse to the point where it aspires to become again one of East Africa’s pre-eminent intellectual and capacity building resources, as it was in the 1960s. It has more than doubled student enrolment, instigated major improvements in the physical and academic infrastructure, decentralized administration, moved from a situation where none of its students paid fees to one where more than 70 per cent do. Where previously the government covered all running costs, now more than 30 per cent of revenue is internally generated. Among varied uses of this revenue, the most important is [38] - with no significant increases in the resources available to the university. This rapid and obviously unplanned expansion led to growing criticism that Makerere had suffered a decline in standards and quality. As observed in the study by Musisi and Muwanga, from which much of the material on Makerere is sourced, “[D]espite the impressive advances in institutional reform at Makerere, there are a number of areas that need substantially more progress to make reform sustainable and meaningful” (Musisi and Muwanga, 2003: 41). A listing of what the study considered “unfinished business” is most instructive. In spite of the increase in own-generated funds and substantial donor support, Makerere continues to depend on government for over 60% of its funding, and is still short of the requirements for sustaining the quality of teachi ng and learning for its much-expanded student population. The study notes “…growing concern from a cross section of the university’s stakeholders - including faculty, students, government officials and donor agencies – that increased enrolment may have jeopardised the quality of learning”. According to material provided in the study, the situation is clearly more dire than this delicate statement would suggest. There was unbearable pressure on space, facilities and staff, as “there ha[d] been little increase in physical infrastructure”, nor had there been any “significant” increase in building space or the numbers of lecturers – despite the tripling of the student population. Not surprisingly, a report issued by the Makerere University Academic Staff Association found that “… more than half the registered students in some courses [did] not attend lectures because of a lack of seats and poor audibility in the lecture halls. Such insufficient facilities and high student-lecturer ratios compromise[d] academic quality.” ( Musisi and Muwanga, 2003: 43) The study itself concludes “If the problem [of insufficient facilities and staff] is not addressed, the large number of students and the resulting decline in standards pose a real danger to the quantitative achievements and innovations in admissions and programming made by Makerere over the last seven years.” Evaluations carried out by a joint university-government committee set up by the Vice-Chancellor showed that two small private universities, the Uganda Martyrs College and the Islamic .: 50) Reference was made to stories in the media about a few female students engaging in “immoral activities” in order to defray the very high living and accommodation charges, even for those on government subsidies. The last point of note is the familiar one of enrolment expansion without broadening. As put by the study: .: 51) To sum up, the reforms of the 1990s brought Makerere “back from the brink”, enlarging access, improving staff conditions, increasing the social relevance of some of its courses, while reducing its dependence on government subvention. However, this has been achieved in a manner that seems to threaten the quality of the teaching and learning environment, and remove the focus from research and reflection as part of the university enterprise. It is difficult to believe that the Vision su pposedly guiding the entire reform process is “To be a centre of excellence, providing world class teaching, research and service related to sustainable development for Uganda.” (“The Makerere Vision”, Strategic Plan 2000/01 – 2004/05 The leadership of Makerere University is not only aware of these problems, but is taking measures, some of which have been mentioned above, to alleviate the problems. [40] It has not had much success so far, hence the consistent addition of a rider on “unfinished business” to unpredictable ways. This situation of institut ional complexity and policy dynamism poses the challenge of how to treat the higher education system as a system, and so structure it as to recognise and accommodate the new needs and new forces, while playing to the strengths of the different components and preserving the enduring social and economic goals of the system. It is against this background that the challenges facing Africa’s universities and their various attempts to survive and thrive must be assessed. In this connection, two points may be made. (a) It is necessary to emphasise the complexity of the environment within which higher education reform has to be undertaken. To the historic problems that need to be overcome - low participation rates, inequitable access, reduced resources available to both state and institutions, and limited capacity of the state to make its own policy choices – two more have equitable arrangements for access and financing at Despite previous failures, however, the timing may be right for a renewed attempt. This is not because the problems have become easier, nor the differences amongst contending interests and visions any less deep-seated. What is new is the acknowledgement by virtually all players that the present situation is untenable, that the condition s of yesteryear cannot now be replicated or restored, that no one has the simple correct answer, and that if appropriate, good faith effort and concessions are not made by all, the situation can only get much worse. A second factor is the renewed interest of both governments and key members of the donor community in the revitalisation of higher education in Africa. A word of caution, however. Despite its potential for good through the provision of additional resources, this renewed interest would not yield a positive outcome unless it is grounded in the fundamental consensus that would arise from the policy consultations suggested above. Autocratic decrees by governments, self-serving technical and policy advice by experts and agencies, and selective funding initiatives by donors cannot be part of a long-term solution to the problems of higher education in the present circumstances of Africa. Box 1: Makerere University in the 1970s and 1980s Funding Cut-backs “Makerere's financial resources from both public and external sources declined dramatically in the 'seventies and 'eighties. … at thesame time that the university was experiencing increasing ressure to expand enrolment. Makerere responded by admitting more students, but with fewe resources than it had had previously for smaller numbers. “The most obvious consequence of the decline in financial resources in the 1970s and 1980s was halls of residence. “The financial crisis had a major impact on teaching staff. Lecturers were demoralized by salaries that were not only meagre but often came late. … Many lecturers took other jobs, bot within and outside of Uganda. ... The lecturers who remained, moonlighted as tutors, taxi drivers, o went into business in order to survive, using university facilities as their operating bases. Althoug many gave the odd weekly lecture, they had little time for seminars, tutorials or one-to-one studen institutional management during this period. … students remained without exposure to advances i information technology, and overall impact on the faculty was minimal. Administration an management processes remained almost totally manual. Impact on research “The university's research infrastructure and outp ut suffered substantially …. The university ha built up a substantial research infrastructure w hose outputs received international acclaim. In the first years after independence (1962-1970), political stability and the hopes created by independence brought new research initiatives to the university. Of particular note were the Eas African Institute of Social Research, which b ecame the Makerere Institute of Social Researc (MISR), the University Farm at Kabanyoro, th e Medical School research programme at Mulago Hospital and the Faculty of Science, especially in Botany, Chemistry, Physics and Zoology. Unde [the regime of President Iddi] Amin, most expatriate scholars and researchers left the country, donor agencies and other external financiers disengaged themselves, and collaborative research reoccupation with economic rehabilitation and suppression of internal civil strife left research institutions and programmes running on a maintenance-only basis. By the mid-to-late 'eighties, few active research programmes came to life wi th the sporadic return of external support, notably at the Veterinary Faculty, Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Agriculture an Forestry and Faculty of Education. However, this was funding for specific projects, generally in areas of the particular donor's interest, which did not improve the research situation of the university as a whole. … “Small allocations for research resulted in poor facilities, limited access to publishing facilities, limited research database, low output and absence of a research culture. Other consequences … were lack of appreciation of the importance of research, lack of skills to undertake research, lac of experience in research, low priority given to research at the university and in other public institutions, lack of centrally initiated and managed research and emphasis on financial gain as motive for undertaking research.” . (2003) References Addae-Mensah, Ivan (2000), Education in Ghana: A tool for Social Mobility or Social Stratification Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences Kaijage, Erasmus S., Knowledge and Skills of B.Com Graduates of the Faculty of Commerce and Management, University of Dar-es-Salaam, in the Job Market, Accra, AAU Research Paper Series # 8. (See http://www.aau.org/studyprogram/lists.htm Knight, Jane (2002), Trade in Higher Education Services: The Implications of GATS The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, London: The International Strategic Information Service Koch, E., C. Foxcroft and A. Watson (2001), “A development focus to student access at the Manuh, Takyiwaa, Joseph Budu and Sulley Gariba, (2002) Change and Transformation in Ghana’s Public Universities: A study of experiences, challenges and opportunities (Unpublished) Higher Education, Vol. 36: 21 – 41 Mayanja, Muhammad K (2001), A comparative study of Makerere University Graduates of the Faculties of Arts and Sciences Accra, AAU Research Paper Series # 9 (See http://www.aau.org/studyprogram/lists.htm Mazrui, Ali A (1978), “The African University As a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency”, in Philip G Altbach and Gail Paradise (eds.) Education and Colonialism New York: Longmans: 331-352 Mbemba, Gaspard, “Congo (Brazzaville)”, in Teferra and Altbach (2003) Mkandawire, Thandika (1995), “Three Generations of African Academics: A Note” Transformation , No. 28 Mkude, Daniel, Brian Cooksey and Lisbeth Levey (2003), Higher Education in Tanzania Oxford: James Currey; Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam Musisi, Nakanyike B. (2003), “Uganda”, in Teferra, Damtew and Philip G Altbach (2003), (eds.) African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press Musisi, Nakanyike B., and Nansozi Muwanga (2003), Makerere University in Transition, 1993- 2000 Oxford: James Currey; Kampala: Fountain Publishers N’Guerekata, Gaston M, “Central African Republic” in Teferra and Altbach (2002) Ndiaye, Honore-Georges, “Senegal”, in Teferra and Altbach (2002) Ngome, Charles, “Kenya” in Teferra and Altbach (2002) Ntshoe, I. M. (2002), “Globalising and internationalising the higher education sector: challenges and contradictions in less industrialised countries”, South African Journal of Higher Education Vol. 16, No. 1: 82-90 Obasi, Isaac N., (2002) “The Systemic Components of Nigerian Universities” (Unpublished) Samb, Moussa, Diong, M. & Thiaw, Babacar (2001), Etude sur Le Suivi des Diplômés de L’Université Chiekh Anta Diop de Dakar (UCAD- Senegal) dans Le Milieu de Travail, Accra, AAU Research Paper Series # 7. (See www.aau.org/studyprogram /lists/htm) (See http://www.aau.org/studyprogram/lists.htm Sawyerr, Akilagpa (1994) "Ghana: Relations between Government and Universities", in Neave, G. and F. A van Vught (eds.) Government and Higher Education Relationships Across Three Continents: The Winds of Change Pergamon Press: Oxford, New York, Seoul and Tokyo, 1993, 22-53 Sawyerr, Akilagpa (1998), "Does Africa really need her universities?" Sawyerr, Akilagpa (2002), “’The Public Good’ in African Higher Education: Select Issues for Policy”, Newsletter of the Social Science Academy of Nigeria , Vol. 5, No. 1: 25-30 Sawyerr, Akilagpa (2004), “Conditions for Research Capacity Development – A Challenge for African Higher Education”, in Cheryl Doss, Robert E Evenson, and Nancy Ruther (eds.) African Higher Education: Implications for Development , a special issue of Journal of African Higher Education Boston: Boston College Center for International Higher Education; Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), chap 9 Scott, P. (2002) “The limits of the market: Universities and the knowledge economy”, in Dorrit van Dalen (ed.) The Global Higher Education Market The Hague: NUFFIC: 79-88 Seepe, Sipho (2000), “Higher Education and Africanisation”, Perspectives in Education Vol. 18, No. 3 Shabani, Juma (2000), in Teferra and Altbach (2002) Singh, Mala (2001), “Introduction”, in Reinserting the Public Good into Higher Education Council for Higher Education Discussion Series, 1: 7-22 Social Science Academy of Nigeria (SSAN) (2002) “The Social Science Academy of Nigeria’s Strategic Plan, 2002-2006” (Unpublished) Strydom, A. H. (2002), “Globalisation and higher education studies in South Africa”, South African Journal of Higher Education Vol. 16, No. 1: 91-98 Szanton, David L and Sarah Manyika, (2001) PHD Programs in African Universities: Current Status and Future Prospects (Unpublished) ================================ Notes 1. The following colleagues read earlier drafts of this paper and made most constructive comments: Ron Kassimir, Yann Lebeau, Amina Mama, Esi-Nana Sekyiamah and David Szanton, as did Judith Sawyerr. I wish to acknowledge, too, research and other technical back-up from Adeline Addy and Ransford Bekoe of the AAU Secretariat. 2. There is a much longer history of higher education in Africa dating back to Karawyyin in Fez, Al Ahzar in Cairo, both in the 1st Century AD, and Timbuktu in the 13th Century, and including Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, Liberia College and some of the South African universities, in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The major colonial universities were established by Britain in the Sudan, Nigeria, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Zimbabwe) and Uganda; by the French in Dakar and Tananarive; and by Belgium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire), all between the mid-1940s and the end of the 1950s. 3. The analysis and discussion that follow will be limited to sub-Saharan Africa. Acknowledging that sub-Saharan Africa is not homogenous unit, even for present purposes, this limitation of scope of should, nevertheless make it easier to make useful generalisations, pointing out differences where necessary. The cost will be the loss of the richness of material from North Africa and South Africa. Further, it is recognised that the problems features to be described are not necessarily peculiar to Africa. There will be elements common to most developing countries. 4. Even as late as today (2002), there were none in some of the smaller countries: Cape Verde, difficulties relate to (a) distinguishing between universities and non-university tertiary institutions, as these are classified differently in different countries, and (b) when an institution becomes a fully accredited university. Thus, any aggregation of universities, necessarily involves a large measure of interpretation, with the result that different analysts will end up with more or less different lists and totals. For our purpose, however, the estimates in the text give the correct orders of magnitude and relativities. 12. A series of World Bank papers starting from 1971 and culminating in the very controversial, but influential 1988 policy paper (World Bank, 1988) played a lead role in this. 13. This policy prescription has been heavily criticis ed from within and outside Africa. In addition to challenges to the technical bases for the rates of return analysis and conclusion, the attacks ., 1995; Task Force, 2000). It is ironic that the World Bank, which by its studies and reports, provided the ideological and technical bases for the attack on the higher education in favour of basic education in Africa, has now found, not only broad policy grounds for a more balanced approach, but also technical evidence of “rising returns to university education”. (World Bank, 2002: 26-27). 14. Apart from new World Bank loans for higher education development, potentially the most significant of these was the agreement in April 2000 of the Presidents of four American Foundations (Carnegie Corp. of New York, the Ford foundation, the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation) to constitute a “Partnership to Strengthen African Universities”. This, the “4Foundations Partnership”, proposes to provide up to $100 million in support of selected African universities or higher education systems over a five-year period. While some support has been committed and useful case studies commissioned, it is not and totals. For our purpose, however, the estimates in the text give the correct orders of magnitude and relativities. 19. A further 13 institutions are registered wi th the National Accreditation Board, awaiting accreditation. Yet, the World List of Universities (IAU/UNESCO, 2002) still lists no private universities for Ghana. 20. Curiously, enrolment at the Université Marien Ngouabi, the one public university is reported to have begun to fall after 1997! 21. Forty-seven per cent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa was 15 years old or less in 1998, a figure estimated to drop to just over 42% in 2015. Comparable figures are: East Asia and the Pacific- 27% and 21%; Latin America and the Caribbean - 32% and 26%; OECD countries - 21% and 17%. (UNDP 2001: Human Development Indicators, Table 5). 22. More technical support for the rationality of thes e choices is provided by the consideration that in most systems, while a person with a university degree may not get the kind of job he or she considers appropriate to their qualifications and deserts, they would generally get better-paying jobs than if they had not gone to university. The same is true, though to a lesser degree as between secondary and primary graduates. 23. Obvious exceptions would be situations like apartheid South Africa, where access to education was deliberately discriminatory, or others where subtle cultural or religious conditions created ., 1996; Mazrui, 1978 29. While there are grounds for questioning the ideological direction and social commitment and relevance of much of the work of the immediate post-independence universities, few dispute the quality of teaching, research and publication in the best of them. 30. When the author took over as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana at the beginning of 1985, the subvention from government was disbursed monthly, in arrears ! Many were the months when the disbursements fell below the actual expenditures reported! 31. The phenomenon is reported from the OECD countries too: 28%, 37% and 50% of full-time faculty in the UK, Australia and US, respectively, are over 50 years old, while over a third in and Presidents in membership of the Association of Commonwealth Universities, No. 30, September 2002). 32. Musisi (2003) reports that research output at Makerere University declined by 53% between 1977 and 1987. 33. See also Coleman, 1994: 352 – 353 34. In Brazil 70% of university students are enrolled in private universities. The figures for Korea and the Philippines are 75% and 80% respectively. 35. The material in the following paragraphs is taken from Sawyerr, 2002 36. Report of AAU/UNESCO/CHEMS Workshop on Strategic Planning, 1995. (Unpublished) 36A. Ekong and Plante, 1996 37. See e.g., Court, 1999; Mayanja, 1998; Musisi, 2003; World Bank, 2002. 38. More recent estimates put the figures at over 21,000 public and under 5,000 private students! 39. I@Mak Decentralization: Human resources Demand Assessment (cited in Musisi and Muwanga, 2003). 40. Other measures include the setting up of a committee to see to quality assurance; moves to Constructed from data in Fig. 2.2, World Bank 1998 181 618 660 1316 1750 19751980198519901995 Fig 1: Technological intensity of goods in international trade (%) 19761996 Med & High tech Primary & Resource- 41% 13% 31% None 1 or 2 over 5 Source: UNESCO/IAU 2001 IAU/UNESCO and ersonal investi ation 1.6 3.6 5.2 7.1 9.6 9.6 11.4 13.8 18.4 198019901996 S-S Africa Developing Countries Arab States Latin Amer. & Carribean 802 163 19801995 S-S Africa World Eur. & C. Asia 841 933 2641 4532 2738 4348 19651995 S-S Africa World Eur. & C. Asia 197019952001 S-S Africa World Eur. & C. Asia 143 226 316 108 161 237 140 216 196019701980199020002002 Excl. N. Afric Excl. N. + S. Afric Source: UNESCO/IAU 2001 IAU/UNESCO 2002 and ersonal investi ation Fig. 9: Establishment of Universities in Africa 130 196019701980199020002002 Public Private 1980199020002002 Burundi Kenya Mozambique Senegal Tanzania Uganda Source : UNESCO/I 2001 ; IAU/UNESCO 2002 and ersonal investi ation Source : UNESCO/IAU 2001 ; IAU/UNESCO 2002 and ersonal investi ation 91/9293/9495/9797/9899/00 Gov't sponsored Private Source . (2001): Table 2 656 376 121 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 Source
CHALLENGES FACING AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES