HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE CHAPTER V THE NEW AMERICA 錀The reason we are failing behind is the lack of national purpose in our life⺔ Arthur Schlesinger Jr. In the months preceding Eisenhower鈀s inauguration, Stevenson’s advisors met to discuss the future. Agreeing with Schlesinger, they rightly feared the beginning of an anti-intellectual period, and assumed that Stevenson would be the candidate in 1956 who would bring the ugly new age to an end. Like monks watching the beginning of the Dark Ages, the liberals worried about how to keep ideas alive in the Eisenhower era so that when the Republicans left office, the Democratic party would be able to govern effectively. And, as Galbraith put it, “How can we do the most to keep the Democratic Party intellectually alert and positive during these years in the wilderness?鐀 In addition, the liberals had no desire to spend the campaign season four years hence re-fighting the same old arguments with Stevenson. There seemed to be a need to form a Democratic Study Group, which would educate Stevenson and present solutions for the future. The Finletter Group was born. John Kenneth Galbraith acted asₓDean of Faculty鐀 and recruited Averell Harriman, Arthur Schlesinger, George Ball, Roy Blough, Seymour Harris, Clayton Fritchey, and of course Thomas Finletter. Schlesinger described Thomas Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise (Garden City, 1973), 23. Martin, Stevenson and the World ibid, 83. member of President Truman鈀s Council of Economic Advisors. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE The Finletter Group in the 1950s had the very important effect of making things which Stevenson felt were radical in 52 commonplace by 1956.... macroeconomic management of the economy, deficit financing if that were called for by the circumstances, the trade unions, and the need for their support, and the whole range of social security and medical insurance--all things (about) which Stevenson had exhibited a certain measure of nervousness in 1952 were made sensible and commonplace for him in the Finletter discussions. Schlesinger too felt Stevenson would respond to reason: think we had a lot of impact on him. I can remember when he first asked me to come out and work for him in the 52 campaign, his counsel in Chicago was one of the ablest people I ever met, Carl McGowan. After spending a couple days with Stevenson I went around to McGowan and said “This is wrong for me; he鈀s far too conservative. I won’t be of any use to him; I better go home⺔ And McGowan said, “Don’t be a fool, that鈀s Adlai鈀s way. He always complains and always resists, but you’ll find out he鈀s very intelligent, and will respond in the end to rational argument, so don’t give up so quickly⺔ It was the experience of the Elks Group and the Finletter group that he was intelligent if you could get him to concentrate on something, he would accept the conclusions that his reason dictated, even though sometimes he felt uncomfortable. Crediting Schlesinger鈀s contributions, Stevenson revealed, “Arthur has always been extremely helpful- in writing, in ideas, in developing a program. I鈀ve come closer having a ghost writer in him than in anyone else⺔ Later, when others had taken over Stevenson’s role as liberal leader, many of the ideas that Elks had resented in the 1950’s found their way to the top of the Kennedy and Johnson agendas. Perhaps the most important idea that came out of the Finletter Group was Schlesinger鈀s distinction about the Quality versus the Quantity of Life. As Schlesinger saw the issue in 1955-56, Eisenhower鈀s institutionalization of the New Deal marked the successful solution to most of the quantitative political questions of production, unemployment, the satisfaction of basic material needs. The concerns of 1932 were no longer relevant in 1956. Prospering materially, the suburban swing voters who had elected Eisenhower found themselves suffering from a spiritual malaise. The next problem was how to help America cope with abundance. The quality of American civilization--education, medical care, civil rights, civil liberties, and the arts--was the new issue. And while the crusade abroad was still important, reform at home was the first priority, for only a progressive nation could have a progressive foreign policy. (In particular, slow progress on civil rights weakened America internationally.) The key problem of America was the distribution of goods. Too much of the national wealth went into the private sector, buying cars with big tailfins, and too little went into the public sector, to “buy schools and submarines⺔ Interview, 12/8/81. Interview, 1/14/82. Lasky, J.F.K. 304. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,ₓThe Challenge of Abundance, The Reporter May 3, 1956. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE Public presentation of the idea in Max Ascoli鈀s The Reporter caused a storm among liberals. Max Ascoli and Adolf Berle called Schlesinger an isolationist. Ascoli also objected to Schlesinger s use of big government as a solution to every national problem. But Schlesinger had his defenders too, including Harry Truman, Seymour Harris agreed that the complexities of the 20th century demanded a big government. Schlesinger sent a memo outlining his ideas to Senator John F. Kennedy, who pessimistically replied that the conservative Democratic leadership would not permit any sweeping plan of reform. The Finletter Group as a whole was intrigued by Schlesinger鈀s approach. Schlesinger wrote a memo to Stevenson for the group entitled “The Central Issue for 1956.” The memo set out the political reasoning behind Schlesinger鈀s plan, and summarized, 鍗e have a new age, a new prosperity, increasing leisure. Before us there is vision of a new America. What is the substance of that vision, and what ire we doing, what can we do on a large scale, and practically, to realize it? We must act before it is too late, and before the Eisenhower administration sells our national birthright down the river.鐠鍔he New America” became the theme of Adlai Stevenson鈀s 1956 campaign. John Kenneth Galbraith liked Schlesinger鈀s idea too. He thought some more about the Quality-Quantity distinction, and made it a central theme of The Affluent Society. Galbraith had picked up another idea before from Schlesinger. When Schlesinger remarked during the 1954 stock market slump that no one had written even a minimally competent economic history of the 1929 crash, Galbraith decided to write The Great Crash In the 1960’s, New Left critics complained that the emphasis on the Quality of Life had led to neglect of the remaining poor. Questioned about the charge, John Kenneth Galbraith, whose 1958 book The Affluent Society had included a chapter on the problem of residual poverty, responded: This would be to say that anything that concentrating on any issue other than equality and full employment was unwise because it distracted attention from those issues. There鈀s no reason why you ca溒t emphasize the quality of life, continued economic growth, greater equality, the struggle against poverty, all at the same time Schlesinger himself now feels that the belief that the 鍢asic economic problems which had given rise to the New Deal were more or less solved in the 1950’s (was) to some degree mistaken.鐀 ₓThe Scarcity of Ideas,鐠 The Reporter (May 31, 1956). ₓWe Need a Liberal Administration,鐠 The Reporter (May 31, 1956). Schlesinger, Thousand Days 99. As Kennedy correctly perceived, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, among others, was unwilling to lead the party in a crusade. ibid, 197-198. Galbraith, Life in Our Times 308. Interview 12/8/81. Interview, 1/14/82. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE By 1956, liberalism was recovering. McCarthyism had passed and the Democrats controlled Congress. Moreover, as Schlesinger pointed out in Thousand Days liberalism was regaining its sense of direction. In 1948, Truman had told the voters 錀you never had it so good.” Eight years later, the standard of living was even higher, but the Democrats were telling voters that prosperity was not enough.” The liberal intellectuals Schlesinger, Thousand Days 30. Martin, Stevenson and the World 124. ibid, 215, 234. ibid, 202. ibid, 224. ibid, 251. ibid, 255. ibid, 239. ibid, 251. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE Although, as Schlesinger expected, the primaries forced Stevenson leftward, civil rights continued to be exasperating. Stevenson’s remarks aboutₓgradualism鐀 frightened liberals, and the refusal to speak out strongly on Emmet Till, the Chicago Negro who had been lynched for allegedly whistling at a white woman, discouraged Schlesinger. Stevenson showed no interest in Schlesinger鈀s plan to withhold federal funds from states disobeying federal civil rights laws. Instead, he hoped for a one-year moratorium on demonstrations and lawsuits, to give white southern moderates time to move forward. But the main problem Schlesinger saw was not Stevenson’s actions, but his heart. Schlesinger wished that Stevenson would follow Senator John F. Kennedy鈀s strategy: 錀If we can communicate (deep) concern, then we can remain as responsible and uncommitted as we want to be when it comes to policy⺔ Stevenson was more interested in progressive ideas in the foreign policy field. Schlesinger had advised Stevenson not to bring up the issue of a Hydrogen Bomb test moratorium, for raising the issue would be morally right, it would be politically dangerous. Although atomic testing was an important issue, Schlesinger did not feel Stevenson should risk sacrificing the Presidency for it. “Let Hubert try it. He鈀s expendable,” Schlesinger offered. But in April 1956 Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union called for ban on H-Bomb tests. Schlesinger urged Stevenson to call the bluff. On April 21st, 1956, Adlai Stevenson, in a speech partly writer by Schlesinger, spoke before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in favor of a ban on H-Bomb testing. The Eisenhower administration, which had been considering such a ban itself, immediately labeled the proposal muddle-headed and impractical. University of California regent John McCone angrily criticized professors who supported Stevenson’s plan. On July sixth, Schlesinger joined the Stevenson staff full time with the title “Head Speech writer.” Collaborating with Schlesinger were John Bartlow Martin and Willard Wirtz, and a host of part-timers, including John Kenneth Galbraith and Seymour Harris. Discussing Vice-Presidential possibilities, Schlesinger stated that Humphrey was the most-qualified contender, but Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy would help the ticket more. Schlesinger optimistically wrote the eager Kennedy, 錀Things look good.” At the convention, Kennedy narrated a film called Pursuit of Happiness to which ibid, 285. ibid, 238, 259. ibid, 269. ibid, 301-302. ibid, 259. ibid, 235. Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man (Garden City, 1976) 227. Martin, Stevenson and World, 262. ibid, 308-312. Victory Lasky, R.F.K.: The Myth and the Man (New York, 1968), 171. Lasky鈀s book on John Kennedy is cited as J.F.K ., and the book on Robert Kennedy is cited as The Myth and the Man. Martin, Stevenson and the World, 343. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 85. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE Schlesinger had contributed. Although Kennedy had campaigned hard for Stevenson in HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE But the campaign did not progress as well as their friendship. Even Schlesinger, well-known to prefer the details of political work to issues research thought the campaign 錀an ordeal, no fun at all⺔ Perhaps part of the problem was that he found himself, 鍵pstairs writing speeches, while political decisions when being made elsewhere.鐀 And the political decisions, at least through the eyes of Robert Kennedy and the independent voters, were being made poorly. With the campaign drawing to a close, and Stevenson trailing, in part thanks to the October Suez crisis, he considered raising the issue of Eisenhower鈀s health. When asked, Schlesinger assured the candidate, 錀It鈀s true and the people should know it⺔ Just before the election, Stevenson spoke on television, and warned the voters that the best scientific evidence indicated that Richard Nixon would be President within four years. Coming at the end of the campaign, the remark looked like a last desperate low blow, and cost Stevenson support. Later, Schlesinger regretfully stated, “I wish I had said it was wrong- because I thought it was⺔ Much to the distress of Schlesinger and the rest of the Democratic left, Eisenhower鈀s re-election primed America for four more years of blandness and mediocrity. What Partisan Review and other intellectual opinion-molders had begun under Truman—a positive re-evaluation of American life—had degenerated into a shallow acceptance of all things American. Schlesinger鈀s own brand of history, which emphasized class conflict, fell into disfavor asₓconsensus historyⲔ which argued that the American past contained few sharp, unresolvable conflicts, became popular. Even intellectuals, it seemed, were being swallowed up in a vast consensus of happy feelings about America. Time the official house organ of the middlebrow, which had complained in 1953 about the gap between the intellectual and society, could by 1956 devote a story to the new breed of intellectuals such as Jacques Barzun and Herman Wouk who showed the intellectual as a Man of Affirmation, instead of Man of Protest. Schlesinger replied that there were many possible roles for the intellectual, and that affirming Henry Luce鈀s vision of America was not the only one. To combat the stifling unanimity, thought Schlesinger, America needed more critical intellectuals. He even had kind words for the right-wing columnist Westbrook Pegler, for Pegler鈀s willingness to criticize the established order. But everywhere Schlesinger looked, he saw only more and more conformity. Things got so bad that Schlesinger found the need to remind Saturday Evening Post readers thatₓOur New-Found Leisure Won’t Bore Us, If Some of It is Spent in Reading⺔ Martin, Stevenson and the World 298, 354. Current Biography 1979, 330. Martin, Stevenson and the World, 390. Some historiographers, on the basis of The Vital Center place Schlesinger in the consensus schools. But ascribing a consensus view to his history is to miss his thesis, for he believed that the ages of Jackson and Roosevelt showed an irreppressible class conflict. That Schlesinger thought the class conflict could be resolved within the framework of liberal democracy did not make the conflict any less serious. But after working with President Kennedy later, Schlesinger would conclude that the sharpest period of American class struggle lay in the past, not the future. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 錀Time and the Intellectuals,鐀 The New Repubic (July 16, 1956), reprinted in Politics of Hope 230-236. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE He feared America was becoming a nation of “viewers, rather thinkers.鐀 Part of the problem of the nation of viewers was the debasing effect of theₓcompetitive situation” on television programming. Agreeing with John Quincy Adams that a government is responsible for theₓmoral, political, and intellectual improvemen璔 of its citizens, Schlesinger urged the F.C.C. to set minimum quality guidelines. Schlesinger saw the problem as an American retreat from individualism into a collectivist, corporate ethos. When social commentators observed growing trends toward androgyny, Schlesinger explained, “If people do not know who they are, it is hardly surprising that they are no longer sure what sex they are⺔ The whole problem could be traced to national leadership. In a 1958 Saturday Evening Post article, he bemoaned, “The Decline of Greatness⺔ The present age, unlike the one just passed, had few giants or towering figures. The nation needed to once more find the great man, who, like lightening, would ignite the creative energy of the nation. “If our society has lost its wish for heroes and its ability to produce them, it may well turn out to have lost everything else as well.鐀 But others worried that over-reliance on “great leaders鐀 would be destructive of democracy. Some critics argue that Schlesinger and the rest of the liberals relied on charismatic leaders to carry out programs that the intellectuals could not rationally convince the populace to follow. In 1960, when the tides of world politics seemed to be flowing back towards heroic leadership, Schlesinger addressed some of the concerns about great men. He happily noted the trend in the Third World and in Western Europe towards powerful personal leadership. But did not the trend threaten democratic institutions? Schlesinger admitted that John Locke saw no special role for the leader. But democracy, Schlesinger argued, is not self-executing. Our system of checks and balances tended towards inertia. While one might resist heroic leadership on ideological grounds, heroic leadership in practice made democracy function better. On a more fundamental level, heroic leadership was necessary to remind the populace that an individual could make a difference--that individual choice mattered. In any case, thought Schlesinger, tyranny was unlikely. Strong traditions of liberty in the United States and Britain kept rulers from going too far. Realistically assessing the role of leaders would prevent over-reliance on them: One should see what the leader said and felt about democracy, and whether he persuaded or manipulated the populace; 錀The emergence of a cult of personality, for example, is an obvious danger sign.” But the real danger came not from strong popular leadership, but from the vacuum caused by inertia. As long as popular leaders made government function effectively, no cry for a Caesar Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 錀Our New-Found Leisure Won鈀t Bore Us If Some of It is Spent in Reading,鐀 The Saturday Evening Post (Apr.18, 1959), 10. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 錀Notes on a National Cultural Policy,鐀 Daedalus (Spring 1960), reprinted in Politics of Hope 255-260. Douglas T. Miller and Marion Novak, The Fifties (Garden City, 1977), 169. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,ₓThe Decline of Greatness,鐀 The Saturday Evening Post (Nov.1, 1958), reprinted in Politics of Hope, 23-32. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Modern Caesars versus Democracy address May 19, 1960 at the University of New Brunswick. HE IGHBROW IN MERICAN OLITICS RTHUR CHLESINGER AND THE OLE OF THE NTELLECTUAL IN OLITICS AVID OPEL HAPTER PAGE would arise. This is a chapter from David B. Kopel, The Highbrow in American Politics: Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and the Role of the Intellectual in Politics Honors Thesis in History, Brown University, May 1982. Awarded Highest Honors, and the National ₓArthur Schlesinger Jr.,ₓOn Heroic Leadership,鐠 Encounter (Dec. 1960), reprinted in Politics of Hope 3-22. Interview 3/29/82. Schlesinger, Thousand Days 25-26. Lasky, J.F.K. 304-305.s